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Training on complements in English, German, and Mandarin has been reported
to trigger improvements on both complements and Theory of Mind (ToM), with
typically developing (TD) pre-schoolers on the verge of developing these skills
(Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; Shuliang et al., 2014).
In the current study, we build on the idea that increasing mastery of complementation
holds the promise of enhancing ToM, and seek (i) to replicate the positive effects
observed in previous work for this effect in French-speaking TD children, and (ii) to
pilot extending this to clinical children, more specifically those with Autism Spectrum
Disorder (ASD) and Developmental Language Disorder (DLD), through exploring whether
improvement in the latter, clinical groups follows that of the TD group. Sixty children
with ToM difficulties, 16 with ASD (aged 5;6–11;8), 20 with DLD (aged 4;8–9;0) and
24 typically developing children aged (2;9–5;3 years), participated in a 4-week training
program. Half received training targeting sentential complements and half received a
control training targeting lexical skills. Complementation training, but not lexical training,
led to a significant direct increase in complements, and also had the indirect effect of
significantly boosting belief reasoning. TD and clinical groups followed the same patterns
of performance. These results confirm previous findings in other languages for TD,
and further suggest promising new directions for therapeutic programs addressing ToM
delays in populations of different aetiologies, namely the incorporation of a motivating
training on complementation.
Keywords: Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Developmental Language Disorder (DLD), Theory of Mind (ToM),
sentential complements, training program

INTRODUCTION
The ability to grasp that people’s mental representations of the world may or may not correspond
to reality is an important milestone in the development of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) (Dennett,
1978; Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Flavell, 1999). Typically developing (TD) preschool children
struggle at tasks requiring them to predict another’s actions based on their false belief (FB)
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(Wellman et al., 2001). Such tasks usually involve a protagonist
whose mistaken belief about an object has arisen because (1) the
object was displaced (Change of Location Task, Wimmer and
Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) or (2) the object has the
appearance that it might contain something else than its actual
contents (Unexpected Contents, Gopnik and Astington, 1988).

2007). The linguistic determinism approach (de Villiers, 2007)
maintains that a specific grammatical structure is most crucially
solicited during mentalizing, namely complement clauses such
as (3), where a proposition is embedded under a verb of
mental-state (e.g., think, believe) or communication (e.g., say,
mention):

(1) Sally places a ball in a basket, then leaves. While she
is absent, Anne arrives and moves the ball from the
basket to a box. Sally returns, and the children are
asked: (a) Where Sally will look for her marble? (The
critical “belief ” question), (b) Where it is really? (The
“reality” question), (c) Where it was at the beginning? (The
“memory” question).
(2) After being presented with a Smarties tube, the children
are asked what they think is inside, to which they typically
reply: ‘Smarties.’ It is then revealed that in fact there are
pencils inside, at which point the child is asked if s/he can
remember the contents of the tube, as well as the critical
test question: What would another person would think
is inside?

(3) That doll thinks/ believes / says/ mentions that [her ball is
in the basket / some Smarties are in this tube]
This linguistic tool would serve to efficiently represent
subjective truths because the content of the complement (in
brackets) has an independent truth-value, and consequently can
be false while the entire sentence remains true. These semantic
and syntactic properties render complements ideal tools for
grasping propositional attitudes and thus efficiently representing
subjective truths (Perner, 1988; de Villiers et al., 2014), albeit with
some cross-linguistic variation (Perner et al., 2003; Cheung et al.,
2004; Tardif et al., 2007).
In support of the view that complementation assists complex
ToM reasoning, authors have reported links between mastery of
this structure and success at FB in young TD children (de Villiers,
2000; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000) as well as in children
with ASD (Tager-Flusberg, 2000; Tager-Flusberg and Joseph,
2005; Lind and Bowler, 2009) and language-delayed deaf children
(Schick et al., 2007). Interestingly, these links are also found when
the complements do not occur with mental state verbs but rather
with verbs of communication, which themselves do not refer
explicitly to mental states (de Villiers and Pyers, 2002; Durrleman
and Franck, 2015). Indeed the latter verbs, being less abstract than
mental state verbs, have even been argued to be most crucial for
ToM success in children with ASD (Tager-Flusberg and Joseph,
2005). Knowledge of sentential complements, rather than of
mental state lexicon, would therefore allow children to bootstrap
their meta-representational grasp of beliefs.
If language skills, in particular with complementation, serve
for belief reasoning, then populations with language difficulties
that include complementation would also be expected to struggle
with this aspect of ToM. This seems to be the case for children
with Developmental Language Disorder (DLD). Children with
this condition display primary difficulties in formal language
(Leonard, 2014) including complementation (Tuller et al., 2012;
Steel et al., 2016) and are also reportedly delayed in ToM,
even if these delays appear to be more subtle than those
attested in ASD (Holmes, 2002; Tucker, 2004; Andrés-Roqueta
et al., 2013). Moreover, mastery of complements by children
with DLD also relates to their success at ToM as measured
by false-belief tasks (de Villiers et al., 2003; Miller, 2004).
Interestingly, the verbal demands of the ToM tests administered
in the studies conducted with this population may impact
their performance (Miller, 2001), but these alone do not suffice
to clearly explain their ToM performance, as even tasks that
rely minimally on language pose problems, suggesting that the
difficulty is at the level of ToM reasoning (Nilsson and de
López, 2016). In favor of the view that language influences
ToM reasoning and not only verbal ToM task performance,
relations between complements and low verbal ToM tasks
have been reported for both DLD (Durrleman et al., 2017a)

Accurate responses during tasks such as those above are only
attested around the age of 4–5 years in TD (Wellman et al., 2001;
Milligan et al., 2007). It is important to emphasize the conceptual
difficulty involved during FB attribution: the child must reconcile
the contradiction between what s/he knows and what the other
believes. This is a sophisticated step, preceded by simpler mental
states attributions. The attribution of diverse desires and beliefs,
for instance, does not require the child to reconcile a perspective
in contradiction with what they know to be true, and these FBprecursors emerge earlier in development than the attribution of
FB, i.e., before age 4 (Wellman and Liu, 2004).
The emergence of successful mentalizing including FB
reasoning is important for the development of social cognition on
various levels, e.g., fluid conversational skills, conflict resolution,
popularity amongst peers, etc. (Astington and Jenkins, 1999;
Astington, 2003; Astington and Pelletier, 2005; Astington and
Edward, 2010; Mazza et al., 2017; Derksen et al., 2018). In
certain clinical populations, such as children with Autism
Spectrum Disorder, difficulties with FB reasoning often persist
later in development, affecting performance on FB tasks even
at a mental age of 9 years (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). This
marked delay has been interpreted to indicate a core mindreading deficit (Baron-Cohen, 1990), which would explain
weaknesses in communicative and social skills characteristic
of the autistic condition (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, 5th edition). However, a subset of children
with ASD, from 20 to 50% (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Prior
et al., 1990), systematically succeeds at FB attribution and
thus arguably can surmount their fundamental ToM difficulty
(Tager-Flusberg and Joseph, 2005). It has been claimed that
in order to accomplish this, they apply verbal strategies. Put
differently, children on the spectrum could use language to
support their reasoning about others’ beliefs, with some studies
suggesting that lexical abilities play a role in ToM (e.g.,
Happé, 1995), and others pointing rather to the importance
of grammatical skills (Fisher et al., 2005; Milligan et al.,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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regressions or ANOVAS, especially when variables are highly
intercorrelated, as they are in this study. It models the
relationships among multiple independent and dependent
variables simultaneously, unlike linear regression, which can
only analyze one layer of linkages at a time. Because SEM
can test multiple pathways, it allows the investigation of both
direct and indirect effects in one hypothesized model (Gefen
et al., 2000). This is important in determining the particular
role that the complement training plays in advancing false
belief understanding.

and ASD (Durrleman et al., 2016a). Taking as a point of
departure that language is not only fundamentally related to
mentalizing, but also influences its development rather than
vice versa as revealed by longitudinal studies (TD: Astington
and Jenkins, 1999; ASD: Tager-Flusberg and Joseph, 2005),
researchers have aimed to trigger ToM via the training of
complements in preschool TD children. Results have revealed
that this training is indeed effective at boosting ToM, even
when training involved complements of verbs of communication
alone (Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Shuliang et al., 2014)
and when deceptive scenarios (i.e., involving appearance-reality
dissociations) were not included to train complements (Lohmann
and Tomasello, 2003; Shuliang et al., 2014), although capitalizing
on both complements and deceptive scenarios together appears
to be especially useful for consolidating ToM. Still, none of
these studies on complementation training included participants
delayed for either language or ToM, and instead focussed on
children on the cusp of developing these skills anyway. It thus
remains to be determined whether populations where ToM
and/or language is affected would show similar boosts in belief
reasoning to that already observed in TD children due to
complementation training. The current work is thus concerned
with elucidating whether training sentential complements can be
beneficial for the remediation of belief reasoning in children with
ASD and those with DLD, along the lines of TD. It is also an open
question whether enhancing complementation can also be useful
for other aspects of ToM beyond false belief reasoning, such as
grasping diversity of desires.
In the current study, we build on the idea that increasing
mastery of complementation holds the promise of enhancing
ToM, and seek (i) to replicate the positive effects observed in
work on other languages for this effect in French-speaking TD
children, and (ii) to pilot extending this to clinical children, more
specifically those with ASD and DLD, through exploring whether
improvement in the latter, clinical groups follows that of the TD
group. If this proves to be the case, our results would suggest
a novel, evidence-based, clinical intervention, addressing both
language and ToM in these populations.
We explore several other questions as well with our rich data
set. We verify that complementation training is more effective
for complements and ToM than a more general, lexical training.
We test whether the effects of complement training are particular
to false beliefs assessed verbally, or encompass low-verbal false
beliefs too. We ask whether the contribution of complementation
is specific to false belief reasoning, or whether it can be observed
to assist other, earlier-mastered aspects of ToM, like diverse
desires and true beliefs. Importantly for clinical purposes, we
ask whether the hypothesized ToM gains persist through time
by retesting after a delay. Finally, we ask whether the control
group, who received lexical training, differentially improved to
the target, complementation training group, on the lexical tasks.
In addition to individual analyses on the outcome measures,
we undertake a Structural Equation Model (SEM) to look
more closely at the pathways of change, for example, asking
whether the success of complement training depended on
other abilities, such as non-verbal reasoning or language
skills at outset. SEM allows several advantages over simple
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
All of the participants in this study were native French-speakers,
recruited in Geneva and Lausanne, Switzerland and Paris, France.
The project received approval from the Ethics Committee of
the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of the
University of Geneva as well as from the Geneva Cantonal
Ethics Commission, and was also declared at ‘La Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL)’ in France.
Children’s parents all provided written, informed consent for
their child to participate.
Sixty children participated in the study: 16 children with
ASD aged 5;6–11;8 (M = 8;3), 20 children with DLD aged
4;8–9;0 (M = 6;9) and 24 TD children aged 2;9–5;3 years
(M = 4;3). Differences in age were due to the fact that
difficulties on ToM have been attested at different phases
of development in these three populations. Matching was
done on the groups’ linguistic and cognitive characteristics
as explained below. Children with ASD were recruited from
specialized schools, those with DLD from speech-language
centers which they attended after school, and TD children
from kindergartens and day-care facilities. We targeted children
of the age range when complements and ToM are reportedly
not yet mastered, hence for TD children this meant choosing
children between the ages of 3 and 6 years (Wellman et al.,
2001), for children with DLD the upper cut-off was age 9
(Andrés-Roqueta et al., 2013; Nilsson and de López, 2016) and
for children with ASD this cut-off was extended to 12 years
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Yirmiya et al., 1998). Then, for these
children to be included in the study, they had to meet several
criteria: (i) TD children had to have no history of language
impairment and needed to be included in normal classrooms
without support. (ii) In contrast, clinical groups had to have
been previously given the relevant diagnosis by a qualified
professional. More specifically, children with DLD needed to
have obtained language scores of at least 2 SDs below agespecific norms according to standardized tests used by speech
and language pathologists in Switzerland and France (CIM 10;
De La Santé, 1993), while children with ASD had to have met
the criteria for this condition according to the DSM-IV-TR
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000), the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule, ADOS (Lord et al., 2003)
and/or the ADI-R (Rutter et al., 2003). (iii) Scores on pre(training)-tests assessing ToM and complements also had to
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leave enough of a margin for progress to be achieved, thus only
children performing equivalent to or below 70% were included
(equivalent to a maximum of 8 successful items out of 12 on
FB and 4 successful items out of 6 on false complements). (iv)
In addition, parents had to report that their child’s language
comprehension was of the level to understand simple subjectverb-object sentences, which was subsequently confirmed by
experimenters upon the first meeting during language tasks
(Exalang et al., 2006), such that leading them up to complex
sentences in a relatively short space of time could be feasible. (v)
Finally, only children who could attend to pre-tests could proceed
to training.1
Within each population, one half was assigned to the
target-training program involving the teaching of sentential
complements, while the other half was assigned to an alternative
training program focussing on lexical enrichment. The latter
group allowed us to confirm that any effects arising with
complementation training were not due to general linguistic
stimulation. This preliminary study involved small groups
of participants for each population of children. Because our
hypotheses were identical for all of these populations, we
analyzed their data grouped together and focused on the type of
training, and then conducted analyses to see whether the overall
results were driven by any subgroup/specific population(s), i.e.,
whether progress in the TD and clinical groups were similar.
Amongst the target-training group, there were 21 boys and
9 girls and amongst the control-training group there were

20 boys and 10 girls. The two groups of 30 were matched
on a variety of global cognitive and linguistic standardized
measures (all t < 1, see Table 1 for precise p-values), namely
non-verbal reasoning (Raven et al., 1998), as well as general
morphosyntax and lexicon (Exalang 3–6; Helloin and Thibault,
2006). For more specific measures, we created tests assessing:
(i) complementation understanding (based on de Villiers and
Pyers, 2002) and (ii) ToM abilities. The latter included a
verbal measure of false-belief (based on Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985), a minimally (low-)verbal measure of false-belief (based
on Woolfe et al., 2002) as well as a test assessing skills
emerging just before false-belief reasoning (FB precursors),
namely diverse desires and diverse beliefs (based on Burnel
et al., 2017). We refer to the latter as low-verbal ToM and
FB precursors. Table 1 presents the descriptive measures of
the children included in each of the training groups. Details
on the descriptive characteristics of the cognitive groups (TD,
ASD and DLD) are reported in Table 2. While these groups
differ for age [F(2,52) = 37.57, p < 0.001], for reasons explained
above, they do not differ on standardized measured of nonverbal reasoning (p = 0.09), and morphosyntax (p = 0.23) or
lexicon (p = 0.27).

Material and Procedure
Pre-tests assessed a series of relevant measures, namely ToM
(via verbal and low-verbal FB tasks as well as a mini-test
of FB precursors), complements, lexicon, morphosyntax and
non-verbal reasoning (see below for more details on these
measures). One to two weeks after being tested for the first time,
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two training
programs, i.e., either that of complements or lexicon. Each

1

A total of 11 children were eliminated after the pre-tests from the initial cohort
of 71 participants: 3 TD, 4 ASD and 4 DLD. For 10 children, this was because of
ceiling performance, and for 1 child with ASD this was because of hypersensitivity
to the sounds of the testing material.

TABLE 1 | Means (standard deviations) on paired variables at the moment of pre-test for the two groups (syntactic training, lexical training) and the three populations of
children (TD, Typically Developing; ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; DLD, Developmental Language Disorder).

TD
n = 12
Chronological Age

Syntactic training

Lexical training

n = 30

n = 30

ASD
n=8

DLD
n = 10

TD
n = 12

6.58

4.35

18.10

14.50

11.40

10.58

34.5

33.7

5.92 (1.97)
4.29

Raven

7.52

Global morphosyntax

16.25

Global lexicon

10.57

False Complements/6

34.4

Verbal FB/6

1.50

Low-verbal FB/6

0.75

1.17

0.70

0.90

FB Precursors

3.13

2.20

2.50
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5.38

t(56) = 0.58, p = 0.56
11.90

30.4

t(58) = 1.13, p = 0.27
33.6

4.90

3.50

2.13

t(58) = −0.26, p = 0.79
1.60

1.50

t(58) = −1.18, p = 0.25
0.70

2.73 (2.18)

4.77 (1.48)
4.25

10.29

0.93 (1.17)

2.60 (1.90)
2.58

t(58) = 0.25, p = 0.80
17.70

1.57 (1.48)
2.10

0.63 (0.76)
0.50

15.63

32.8 (6.4)

1.47 (1.50)
0.92

t(58) = 1.16, p = 0.25
7.25

10.97 (1.94)

34.2 (2.8)
33.8

9.04
15.87 (4.90)

10.62 (2.54)
10.00

DLD
n = 10

6.57 (2.36)

15.53 (5.26)
12.92

ASD
n=8

T-tests results

4.13

t(58) = −0.25, p = 0.80
1.90

4.69 (1.65)

4

5.88

t(57) = 0.19, p = 0.85
5.22
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material, so that children had to adjust their predictions
depending on the changing epistemic state of the agent
(Forgeot d’Arc and Ramus, 2011). We created three sets of
tests, meaning that children who participated in the entire
study saw a total of 108 different items (54 FB items and
54 TB items) over the course of three testing sessions, and
never saw the same item twice. The order of the items
which made up each test was randomized and counterbalanced
across participants.

TABLE 2 | Descriptive characteristics of participants.
TD (n = 24)
Chronological Age

ASD (n = 16)

DLD (n = 20)

4.32 (0.67)

8.28 (2.02)

6.92 (1.53)

Raven

13.71 (4.72)

15.94 (15.94)

17.90 (4.54)

Global morphosyntax

10.29 (2.29)

10.43 (2.06)

11.65 (2.16)

Global lexicon

33.75 (3.17)

32.38 (8.31)

34.05 (2.72)

program lasted 4–6 weeks. One to two weeks after training ceased,
immediate post-(training)-tests were administered to determine
potential gains on abilities targeted by the programs, namely
complements, ToM and lexicon. Again 4–6 weeks went by, this
time without training, and another set of tests was administered,
i.e., ‘follow-up’ or ‘delayed’ tests. These ‘follow-up’ tests were
only conducted with children who had made progress of at
least 10% between pre-tests and immediate post-tests in order
to determine whether gains on complements and ToM could be
maintained. Figure 1 outlines the overall experimental design of
the study.

Theory of Mind Tests
ToM was evaluated via a total of 12 FB items. These
were interspersed with 12 TB items. Of the 12 FB items,
6 formed a verbal ToM task and 6 others a low-verbal
one (again 6 true and 6 false beliefs). For each task, the
child’s response always implied selecting one element amongst
three, two involved in the scenario presented (corresponding
to a true vs. a false belief), while the third was unrelated
to the story.
The verbal ToM task was directly inspired by the SallyAnne Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). As explained above,
in the FB scenarios of this task, the child is confronted with
an object being moved from location 1 to location 2 in the
main protagonist’s ignorance and has to capitalize on this
protagonist’s false belief to predict that s/he will look for the
desired object in location 1 (where it is no longer present).
For example, one of the proposed scenes in our assessment
was: “This is Bob. This is the mother. Bob has a yellow pot.
The mother has a green pot. Bob has a ball, he puts the ball
in his yellow pot. Bob is going out to play. The mother takes
the ball out of the yellow pot and puts it in the green pot.
Now Bob comes back, he wants to play with the ball. Where’s
Bob going to get his ball?”. The child must then choose from
three answers: the initial position (here the basket), the place
where the object is actually located (here the box) and the
position of the middle representing an object not involved in
the story (here a bag). To succeed, children must take into
account Bob’s misrepresentation while putting aside their own
knowledge of reality. In the true belief, filler scenarios, the
displacement occurred in front of Bob (see Figure 2), or while
he was absent the object was manipulated and returned to its
original position.

Pre- and Post-tests
All tests, both pre and post, were conducted on laptop
computers, to contrast with the materials used for the training
itself, which was administered via iPads. This distinction
between testing and training modalities allowed us to
ascertain that any gains between pre and post-tests could
not simply be attributed to increased familiarity with the
material used during tests. Tests assessing ToM and sentential
complements were specifically designed for the study, but
followed the same basic format of tests which have been used
in various previous studies, as explained in more details below.
Administering ToM tests on a screen as opposed to having them
administered by an experimenter held the promise of being
the least penalizing option in particular for children with ASD
(Chevallier et al., 2014).
Each test of our target variables (i.e., complements and
ToM) contained 36 items, which were all animated scenarios.
Eighteen of these items involved FB, i.e., they corresponded
to the test condition, while the other items involved true
beliefs (TB). TB items cannot be taken as unambiguous
ToM measures, as accurate responses coincide with reality
responses (Dennett, 1978), however, they allowed varying the

FIGURE 1 | Experimental design.
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The low-verbal ToM evaluation was inspired by Woolfe
et al. (2002), who claim that the task “minimize(s) verbal taskperformance requirements.” This is because the pictures alone are
informative enough for the child to both interpret the scene and
to respond. As an illustration, images would appear on the screen
clearly depicting someone blindfolded who was trying to obtain
an object. This information was then also provided verbally in
the form of commentary, which was thus not crucial for task
success. For example (see Figure 3), in one scene there was a
blindfolded man with a fishing rod and seaweed covering the
object at the end of his rod and the commentary went: “Look!
The man is fishing! He can’t see anything. Let’s see what is behind
the seaweed - Click here!” All children understood and clicked,
which made the seaweed move aside. In one scenario there was
a fish, in another test there was a boot. Then children were then
presented with three objects and asked to click on the object the
man was thinking about, in this instance selecting between a fish,
a boot and a wheel.

three options to select from, the voice said: “Look here: what
is Dad saying that Jean is doing?” (see Figure 4). We pointed
back to the picture and maintained the present tense in light
of observations that past-tense can be difficult for children with
DLD (Rice and Wexler, 1996; Bishop, 2013) and ASD (TagerFlusberg, 1989; Roberts et al., 2004). In the fillers, the report and
the event coincided (true complement) such that it sufficed for
children just to touch the only event evoked (e.g., the father says
that Jean is eating fish and Jean is shown to indeed be eating fish).

FB Precursors
If the participant met the inclusionary criteria defined above after
the main tests, we administered a mini-test evaluating the skills
emerging before the ability to assign false beliefs, namely the
understanding that people differ from each other in their desires
and beliefs (Wellman and Liu, 2004). There were a total of 6 items
seen in each mini-test, 3 diverse desires and 3 diverse beliefs,
such that children participating in the three testing sessions saw
a total of 18 items assessing FB precursors. As an illustration of
an assessment of diverse desires, the child saw an animated story
while hearing the following narration: “What do you prefer: a
carrot or a biscuit?” The child would then select one (usually the
biscuit) and then see a small scene in which another character
chooses the opposite, e.g., “Here is Theo. Theo prefers carrots.
Theo is hungry. What do you think Theo will eat?”. For an
assessment of diverse beliefs, the child heard: “This is Thomas’
book. Sometimes Thomas’ mother puts his book on the table,
sometimes Thomas’ mother puts his book on the shelf. This is
Thomas. Thomas is looking for his book. Where do you think
the book is? On the shelf or on the table?” The child would
then click on one, say the shelf, in which case the story would

Complements Test
The evaluation of sentential complements was inspired by de
Villiers and Pyers (2002). The general format involved one
protagonist reporting an event to another, after which the actual
event was shown. There were a total of 12 items, 6 test FB items
and 6 TB items. In the test items, the complement reported an
event inaccurately (false complement). The child had to simply
recall the content of the erroneous complement uttered in the
first scene in order to score a point. An illustration would be:
“The mother asks the father what Jean is doing. And the father
answers that Jean is eating fish. Look! Jean is giving fish to the
cat!” Then, pointing back to the picture of the parents now with

FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the verbal ToM task.

FIGURE 3 | Illustration of the low-verbal ToM task.
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continue: “For Thomas, the book is on the table. Where will
Thomas look for his book?”.

Standardized Tests
Non-verbal Reasoning
Raven’s matrices (Raven et al., 1998), were also administered
during the pre-test to assess the child’s level of non-verbal
reasoning. During this task, the child must complete 36 series of
increasing difficulty. Each series is presented with a piece missing,
which the child must select amidst six pieces.

FIGURE 4 | Illustration of the complements test.

detail in Supplementary Appendix A. The first activity, inspired
by Wilson and Fox (2013), dealt with infinitival complements
such as: “Sophie sees a baby crying” which are the first kind
to be mastered (Bloom et al., 1989; Diessel, 2004). All other
activities focused on tensed complements of communication
verbs, such as: “The little girl screams that there is a spider in the
bathtub” which are the kind specifically hypothesized to support
ToM (de Villiers, 2007). Six sessions contained new material,
composed of approximately 100 different items. All children were
presented with the entire material at least once, and some saw
it a second time if the experimenters noticed they were still not
excelling after 3 weeks. In this case, material from the beginning
would start over.

Language
Finally, we evaluated the child’s language level using a test
normed for children aged 3–6 years: EXALANG 3-6 tests
(Helloin and Thibault, 2006). We opted for this task to assess
receptive lexical skills (via the designation of images) and
morphosyntactic (via the morphosyntax subtest) because its
general format was very similar to our other tests for ToM
and complements, namely they contained simple, computerized
animations. Also, as mentioned earlier, belief attribution emerges
generally around 4–5 years of age, i.e., along with general
language skills corresponding to this age range, thus we reasoned
that a language task for this age range would be appropriate for
our sample, who were still struggling with FB.

Control Training: Lexicon
The control, lexical training was based on different applications
teaching the lexicon, namely Bitsboard, Flashcards, French
FEL, Apprends-moi les mots (‘Teach me words”) and Animaux
(“Animals”). Several themes are covered during the proposed
exercises, such as colors, food, means of transport, animals, etc.
At each session, we recorded the words learned and thus in
subsequent sessions only checked these again before addressing
the novel words. This training involved the same sort of demands
as the target training, namely image designation, repetition,
truth-value judgment, but also carefully steered away from
mental state terms.

Training
Training programs either focused specifically on complements
(for the target training) or more generally on the lexicon (for the
control training). Each involved five types of activities conducted
on iPads, two to three times per week for maximum duration
of 6 weeks, and a minimum duration of 3 weeks in the event
that children already performed at ceiling at this point of the
training program.

Target Training: Complementation
For the training of complements, we administered a novel
iPad application (Durrleman et al., 2016b), called DIRE, which
means ‘to say’ in French. This name indicates that the program
focuses mainly on the training of complements of verbs of
communication (as well as some complements of verbs of
perception or desire), thus abstracting away from verbs of
mental state such as ‘think’ or ‘believe.’ DIRE also stands
for ‘Differentiating Ideas from Reality via Exercises,’ since the
purpose of the training offered is to assist children with ToM
difficulties to acquire these complements so that they may in
turn apply them during ToM reasoning. We opted for iPad
training, as such methods have already proven to be effective with
clinical populations (Alzrayer et al., 2014). Our training involved
five types of activities, various using pictorial representations of
speech, as previous work has found that visual cues are effective
in remediation programs with ASD (e.g., Wellman et al., 2002;
Paynter and Peterson, 2013).
The five activities of DIRE were administered during each
training session. The order of appearance of the activities was
the same for all children, beginning with activity 1 and ending
with activity 5. Each activity addressed a particular aspect of
complementation via brief exercises, which are explained in

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

RESULTS
Question 1: Did the Target and Control
Training Have Differential Effects?
Our first research question concerns whether the trainings had
differential effects, namely an improvement from pre-test to
post-test specific to the type of intervention (descriptive data
for the syntactic and lexical training are provided in Figure 5).
Specifically, it is necessary to show that the syntactic training
resulted in improvement on false complements, but the lexical
training did not. Next, it is necessary to show that the syntactic
training has effects on False Belief performance, and that the
lexical training did not. Third, it is necessary to show that the
training was not restricted to the verbal false belief tasks, but
applied equally to the verbal and low-verbal tasks.
Recall that the children were selected to have poor
performance on complements and false belief, with the result
that the data were non-normally distributed, as the distributions
were truncated. To do ANOVAs, we tried using the Box-Cox
transformation but homogenous variance and normal error
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FIGURE 5 | Scores on ToM and complements tasks at pre-test and post-test for the syntactic and lexical groups.

There was no prediction that these would be affected by
syntactic or lexical training, so a second set of analyses looked
at the change in these variables compared to the variables
targeted in Question 1.
The Box-Cox transformations were applied first to variables
including precursors to false belief, true belief (verbal and
low-verbal) and true complements, after which assumption of
homogeneity of variance and normal distribution of residuals
were met according to Levene’s tests and Shapiro’s tests.
In order to assess if the target training had a specific effect as
compared to the control training on false complements and false
belief attribution, both crucial to ToM, we ran factorial ANOVAs
with the training group (syntax vs. lexical) and the moment of test
(pre-test vs. post-test) as independent variables on the following
dependent variables: true complements, verbal TB, low-verbal
TB, and precursors to FB. The interaction effect between the
training group (syntactic vs. lexical training) and the moment
of test (pre-test vs. post-test) was not significant effect for true
complements [F(1,55) = 0.58, p = 0.45], verbal TB [F(1,58) = 2.47,
p = 0.12], low-verbal TB [F(1,58) = 2.03, p = 0.16], and precursors
to FB [F(1,57) = 0.18, p = 0.67].

distribution could not be achieved due to this truncation at
one end of the distributions. Therefore, on the variables that
constituted selection criteria, namely false belief (verbal and
low-verbal) and false complements, non-parametric tests were
necessary. Wilcoxon signed rank tests were used in the analysis of
pre- and post-training effects on the false belief and complement
measures for the different training groups. Effects sizes (using r,
Rosenthal, 1994) are reported for the non-parametric test and
regular Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988) are reported for the parametric
test. Using Cohen’s guidelines for r, a large effect is 0.5, a medium
effect is 0.3, and a small effect is 0.1 (Cohen, 1988).
In the syntactic training group, Wilcoxon’s signed rank test
showed a statistically significant difference between pre-test and
post-test on Verbal False Belief (Pre-test: median = 0.50; posttest : median = 4.0; Z = −4.07, p < 0.001, r = 0.74), low-verbal
False Belief (Pre-test: median = 2.0; post-test: median = 5.0;
Z = −3.42, p < 0.001, r = 0.63), and False Complements (Pretest: median = 1.0; post-test: median = 6.0; Z = −4.53, p < 0.001,
r = 0.83) with large effect sizes. However, one-way ANOVAs
showed that there was no significant progression between pretest and post-test on FB precursors [F(1,58) = 2.89, p = 0.09],
Verbal True Belief [F(1,58) = 1.08, p = 0.30], low-verbal true belief
[F(1,58) = 2.60, p = 0.11], and true complements [F(1,58) = 3.20,
p = 0.08], possibly due to already high scores on these variables
(see Supplementary Appendix B).
In the lexical group, one-way ANOVAs showed no significant
progression between pre-test and post-test on precursors of FB
[F(1,56) = 1.46, p = 0.23], verbal True Belief [F(1,54) = 0.60,
p = 0.44], low-verbal true belief (F < 1), or true complements
[F(1,55) = 1.36, p = 0.25]. Non-parametric tests indicate no
significant changes occurred from pre-test to post-test in false
complements (Z = −1.18, p = 0.24, r = 0.21), verbal False
Belief (Z = −1.52, p = 0.13, r = 0.28), or low-verbal false belief
(Z = −1.31, p = 0.50, r = 0.24).

Question 3: Are There Population
Differences in the Effects of Training?
In order to compare the effects of the two trainings in the
three populations, additional factorial ANOVAs were run (see
Figure 6). This third ANOVA (time × training × clinical group)
is exploratory, given the small sample sizes (approximately
10 children per condition). Results showed no interaction
effect between training group (syntax vs. lexical), moment
of test (pre-test vs. post-test) and population (TD vs. ASD
vs. DLD) for false complement [F(2,105) = 0.54, p = 0.59],
Verbal FB [F(2,103) = 0.56, p = 0.57], low-verbal FB
[F(2,105) = 0.02, p = 0.98], true complements [F(2,105) = 1.12,
p = 0.33], Verbal TB [F(2,108) = 0.60, p = 0.55], nonverbal TB [F(2,108) = 0.77, p = 0.46), and precursors to FB
[F(2,106) = 0.68, p = 0.51].
A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the complement
training condition only, with total post FB as the outcome

Question 2: Are There Training Effects on
the ToM Skills Other Than False Belief?
The children were tested also on True Complements, True
Beliefs, and Precursors to False belief both pre and post training.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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FIGURE 6 | Interaction between training (syntax vs. lexicon) and moment of test (pre-test vs. post-test) on verbal false belief, low-verbal false belief and false
complements for the three populations of children (TD, Typically Developing; ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; DLD, Developmental Language Disorder).

(pre-test vs. follow-up and post-test versus follow-up) for the
dependent variables, on 22 children who had showed gains of at
least 10% on the post-test in the syntactic training group. The
progression between pre-test and follow-up test was statistically
significant for verbal FB (p = 0.001, r = 0.81), low-verbal FB
(p = 0.003, r = 0.64), and false complements (p = 0.001, r = 0.88),
with higher scores in follow-up. The mean scores were higher on
immediate post-tests compared to follow-up post-tests, but the
difference between these two post-tests was not significant for
verbal FB (p = 0.265, r = 0.035), and did not reach significance
for low-verbal FB (p = 0.066, r = 0.39) or false complements
(p = 0.096, r = 0.36). Thus there was generally only a small drop
between post-test and follow-up 4–6 weeks after the first post-test
(see Figure 7).

and group as the independent variable. The untransformed
data met the condition on homogeneity of variance by Levene’s
test, and there was no significant difference between the three
groups on total post-FB performance after complement training
[F(2,27) = 0.546, p = 0.586].

Question 4: Did the Lexical Training
Group Show Differential Results on the
Lexicon?
As for results on our standardized test of receptive lexicon, the
syntactic training group did not show a difference between preand post-test scores (Z = 1.3, p = 0.2), whereas the lexical training
group did (Z = 2.6, p < 0.01).2 For detailed information about
participants and their individual results, see Supplementary
Appendices C,D.

Question 6: What Is the Precise Effect of
Training on False Complements?

Question 5: Did the Training Result
Persist Beyond Immediate Post-test?

More powerful statistics were used to explore the contributing
effects of the background variables and training conditions.
Although certain criteria had to be met to be included in the
study, it would be impossible with such a small sample to match
the groups on every variable. Using multiple regressions first
to discover which variables share variance with the outcome,
structural equation modeling (SEM) provided a powerful tool
with which to look at the paths of influence on the outcome of
false belief understanding.3 For example, did the initial level of

In order to assess if the progression observed at post-test was
still present between pre-test and follow-up test, we ran nonparametric comparisons using Wilcoxon matched-pairs signedranks tests with the moment of test as the repeated variable
2

One child with ASD in the lexical training group displayed particularly poor
performance in lexical designation in the pre-test, which could bias group results
in the comparison between pre- and post-test. However, the progression of the
“lexical training group” is still significant even when removing this child from the
analyses (Z = 2.4, p < 0.05). Note also that we proceeded to non-parametrical
(Wilcoxon signed-rank) tests for these comparisons, due to ceiling effects on
this measure.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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SEM by Bentler and Chou (1987) and echoed by many others as a rule of thumb.
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FIGURE 7 | Scores on verbal FB, low-verbal FB and false complements at the moment of pre-test, post-test, and follow-up.
TABLE 3 | Regression results predicting children’s total post-false belief (N = 60).
Predictor

B

B 95% CI
[LL, UL]

SE B

(Intercept)

−0.78

[−3.74, 2.18]

1.48

Age

−0.36

[−0.75, 0.04]

β

sr2

r

0.20

−0.19

0.03

Raven’s Total

0.26∗∗

[0.09, 0.42]

0.08

0.31

0.08

0.26∗

Total Pre-False Belief

0.61∗∗

[0.28, 0.93]

0.16

0.35

0.12

0.30∗

Training

4.88∗∗∗

[3.38, 6.39]

0.75

0.60

0.35

0.58∗∗

Fit

Difference

−0.04

R2 = 0.547∗∗
(Intercept)

−1.08

[−3.65, 1.48]

1.28

Age

−0.32

[−0.67, 0.02]

0.17

−0.17

0.02

Raven’s Total

0.19∗

[0.04, 0.34]

0.07

0.23

0.04

0.26∗

Total Pre-False Belief

0.51∗∗∗

[0.22, 0.79]

0.14

0.30

0.08

0.30∗

Training

2.50∗∗

[0.81, 4.19]

0.84

0.31

0.05

0.58∗∗

Total Post-False Complements

0.79∗∗∗

[0.43, 1.15]

0.18

0.46

0.12

0.72∗∗

−0.04

R2 = 0.667∗∗

1R2 = 0.120∗∗

A significant B-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. B represents unstandardized regression weights. β indicates the
standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits
of a confidence interval, respectively. ∗ p < 0.05. ∗∗ p < 0.01. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

False Belief understanding contribute to the training effect? What
about non-verbal intelligence, as measured by Ravens, or the level
of general language skill (using EXALANG)? And did the child’s
trained mastery of false complements contribute to the false belief
post-test score, or did some children succeed on post-test even if
they did not improve on complements?
The ANOVAs across training and control groups showed no
difference across the TD, ASD and DLD populations in the
outcome, nor any interactions between populations and training

groups. For that reason, the groups and populations could be
collapsed to explore regressions with the outcome variable of
false beliefs (combining low-verbal and verbal tasks into one 12point score). The final regressions contained just the variables
that contributed unique variance to this outcome. As shown
in Table 3, first age was entered and then Raven’s matrices,
the total of pre-training score on False belief (non-verbal and
verbal combined), then Training condition, then the total posttraining score on False complements, since both of these variables
contributed to the outcome.
Having established the significant variables in the regression
for prediction of the outcome, various SEM models were tried to
find the model with the best fit. Although the number of subjects
is on the low side for a SEM, the fit indices can give an indication
of whether the sample has sufficient power to justify the model.
Table 4 shows the results, and Figure 8 shows the optimum
model result, with excellent fit indices.

We test six parameters with a sample of 60 participants. Though the 10:1 ratio is
often considered safe, there are simulations (e.g., Nevitt and Hancock, 2004; Wolf
et al., 2013) that suggest higher numbers are desirable in certain conditions. Latent
variables would render the sample size insufficient compared to the simple path
model explored here. Missing data also would drastically increase the necessary
sample size. An insufficient sample size can result in a failure to converge on
a model, or have poor fit estimates. The current model does not show these
problems, and is supported by the regressions, so we judge it to be a worthwhile
addition despite the small sample.
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DISCUSSION

TABLE 4 | Standardized parameter estimates for the hypothesized model
(N = 60).
B

SE

β

p

Theory of Mind plays a fundamental role in social cognition
(Harris, 2006), and an important step of ToM development
occurs around the age of 4–5 years, when TD children begin to
understand that others have beliefs that differ from their own and
may be in conflict with reality (Wellman et al., 2001). In contrast,
marked delays in consolidating this step in mental reasoning can
be observed in children with ASD (Yirmiya et al., 1998), and more
subtle delays in children with DLD (Nilsson and de López, 2016).
The overarching objective of this work was to identify an efficient
way to address ToM difficulties in ASD and DLD.
Amidst these clinical populations, the subset succeeding at
tasks assessing false beliefs has been shown to display a better level
of language, and in particular grammatical skills (ASD: Fisher
et al., 2005; Paynter and Peterson, 2010; DLD: Farrar et al., 2009;
Andrés-Roqueta et al., 2013). Some authors claim that mastery
of ‘complement clauses’ such as ‘X thinks/ says that Y,’ would
be the grammatical component par excellence facilitating belief
reasoning (de Villiers, 2000, 2007), including in ASD and DLD
(Tager-Flusberg and Joseph, 2005; Durrleman et al., 2016a,
2017a), because the content of the embedded sentence may refer
to a subjective truth. In light of the fact the privileged links have
been found between complements and belief reasoning, not only
in TD (de Villiers and Pyers, 2002) but also in clinical populations
including ASD and DLD (Farrar et al., 2017), our main objective
with this work was to see if complementation training could
yield similar gains across these populations. As such, our target
program aimed to enhance complementation so as to boost
ToM performance not only in TD, which has already been
found, but also in ASD and DLD, which has never before been
investigated. This training was compared to a control training,
which promoted lexical enrichment. Our findings replicate the
results for TD children in other languages to French indicating
that syntactic training focussing on sentential complements
improves both these structures as well as performance on false
belief attribution in this population (Hale and Tager-Flusberg,
2003; Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; Shuliang et al., 2014).
Moreover, children with DLD and ASD, who can display delays in
both syntax and ToM (Yirmiya et al., 1998; Nilsson and de López,
2016), did not show any difference from the TD group regarding

Path Analysis
Raven’s Total → Total Post-FB

0.13∗

0.06

0.16

0.040

Total Pre-False Belief → Total Post-FB

0.45∗∗∗

0.13

0.27

0.001

Training → Total Post-FB (c)

2.63∗∗∗

0.80

0.33

0.001

Total Post-False Complements → Total
Post-FB (b)

0.80∗∗∗

0.17

0.48

0.000

Age → Raven’s Total

1.05∗∗

0.27

0.46

0.000

Age → Total Pre-False Belief

0.28∗

0.14

0.26

0.038

Training → Total Post-False
Complements (a)

3.00∗∗∗

0.48

0.62

0.000

2.38∗∗∗

0.63

0.30

0.001

5.01∗∗∗

0.74

0.63

0.000

Indirect Effect
a×b
Total Effect
c

Standardized parameter estimation for the hypothesized model. All reported
estimates are the maximum likelihood standardized point estimates. 2(7,
N = 60) = 8.934, p = 0.257; comparative fit index = 0.982; Tucker-Lewis
index = 0.963, root mean square error of approximation = 0.068, standardized
root mean square residual = 0.067. ∗ p < 0.05. ∗∗ p < 0.01. ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.

As background variables, the Raven’s score and the pretest False belief score contributed to the final outcome, but
age did not have a direct effect. Importantly, the training
condition had a significant effect on both the False Belief
outcome, and also on the children’s skill on the False
complement post-task. That skill then contributed significantly
also to False belief. A further analysis asked whether the
Training on False complements was instrumental in the
outcome on False Belief via two paths: one direct, and
the other with final performance on False Complements
as the mediating variable. The analysis revealed that there
was indeed an additional mediating effect of the false
complements, as revealed in Table 4. Training has a highly
significant effect on complements (a), which then has an
effect on False Beliefs (b). So the indirect effect is a x b. In
addition, Training has a direct effect (c) on false beliefs, also
highly significant.

FIGURE 8 | Standardized parameter estimation for the hypothesized model.
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argument structure of cognitive verbs, have children who develop
false belief skills earlier (Tompkins et al., 2018). Much debate
has arisen over whether the causal effect is on the child’s own
language, or directly in providing evidence for the theory the
child is building about other minds (de Villiers and de Villiers,
2014). The model in this experimental study hints at a role
for each effect.
Future work on the effects of complementation training
on ToM should seek to include larger cohorts of children
with DLD and ASD, as well as other populations such as
deaf children, who also show difficulties with both embedding
(Tuller and Delage, 2014) and ToM (Peterson and Siegal, 2000).
Subsequent studies should also seek to determine whether or
not the gains are limited in scope (e.g., giving rise merely to
verbal strategies for solving ToM tasks, see e.g., Leslie and
Roth, 1993; Happé, 1995; Tager-Flusberg etal., 1997; TagerFlusberg, 2000; Senju et al., 2010) or short-term, as these
are important concerns, especially for children on the autism
spectrum. It would thus be worthwhile to include a dimension
of testing involving more ecological tasks, such as hide and
seek, as well as parent questionnaires assessing the quality of
the children’s social interactions, testing to be also conducted
well after the intervention has ceased. This would allow a deeper
understanding of whether children’s enhanced grasp of belief
reasoning resulting from complementation training can give rise
to more successful social skills, including in the long term. Such
results could provide clearer arguments in favor of the benefits of
syntactic remediation in ToM programs across aetiologies.

these positive outcomes. This first attempt at explicit syntactic
training with a group including these clinical populations is thus
encouraging regarding the potential direct linguistic gains as well
as the indirect cognitive benefits, as measured by ToM tasks.
The ToM benefits associated with enhanced complementation
skills were observed specifically for false belief reasoning,
and not, e.g., for precursors of this ability such as the
comprehension of diverse beliefs and desires (Wellman and Liu,
2004) or true belief items which can be resolved via reality
responses. The interest of complementation appears indeed
to support a specific component of ToM. It is important
to underline that improvement on FB was observed whether
measured via verbal or low-verbal tasks. Performance on both
of these measures was indeed correlated to complementation
skills, suggesting that language supports not only FB-task
performance, but also the reasoning implied in belief attribution
(de Villiers, 2007). It is also interesting to note that both general
grammatical skills and specific mastery of complementation
relate to mentalizing abilities in typical development on posttests, while atypical development appears to specifically capitalize
on complementation, in line with previous reports (Farrar et al.,
2017). This may suggest different pathways to FB understanding,
potentially related to differences between these populations to
benefit from social interactions (Farrar et al., 2017).
Encouragingly, improvements in complements and ToM were
observed not only during immediate tests but also in follow-up
post-tests, revealing that the training effects were still detectible
over time as revealed by higher performance on follow-up
post-tests compared to pre-tests. Still, despite this durability
in improvements between pre-tests and post-tests conducted
roughly a month after training ceased, there was nevertheless
a very modest drop in performance between immediate posttests and follow-up post-tests, which could indicate that more
training would be required for the results to be sustainable. None
of the previous studies examining the effects of complementation
training in TD children included follow-up post-tests (Hale and
Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; Shuliang
et al., 2014), thus more work is needed to determine whether or
not this is specific to our cohort which included clinical children.
While the children of all populations (TD, DLD, and ASD)
who received the control training improved their lexical abilities,
they did not improve skills on complements or ToM. The
increase in performance observed in the target-training group on
both complements and FB is therefore not achievable via just any
linguistic stimulation, but rather stems from a specific training on
complementation, here administered via DIRE.
The training on complements had two effects, one direct
and one indirect via the improvement on children’s own
complementation skills. That is, some component of the outcome
variance was contributed by being exposed to an enhanced
and carefully designed verbal input on complementation, and
the other, by the child’s skill in producing correct answers to
complementation questions. Evidence for both effects is found
in the developmental literature on false beliefs. Research has
shown that families that engage in much discourse about mental
states, which frequently is coupled with complements given the
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